




The Politics of Reading
Critici~m's recent political turn has unfortunately driven
out discussion of the reading process. The prevailing view seems
to be ,either that reading-theory regards meaning-creation as a
transcendental, ahistorical phenomenon (the invariant structure
of the "implied reader"), or that analysis of reading privileges
the private sphere when there are more important issues at stake
in the larger social arena. These assumptions are questionable,
however, precisely because of the way contemporary criticism has
redefined "politics." In our post-structuralist era, most would
agree with Lyotard that "the observable social bond is composed
of language moves" (Postmodern Condition 11). Consequently (and
as the best reading theorists always knew), reading is not the
private activity of an isolated consciousness but a deployment of
conventions for understanding which help to define the reader's
social being. After Foucault, it is impossible' to see a
contradiction between epistemology and politics because of the
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intimate, ubiquitous relation between knowledge and power.
Reading would seem to be a crucial place for studying how, in his·
words, "truth" is "produced only by virtue of multiple forms of
constraint"--how, paradoxically, the rules for truth which define
"discursive regimes" are both coercive and creative ("Truth"
131). A political theory of reading should regard the construal
of texts as a play of more than merely personal beliefe which can
reproduce or call into question the ways of seeing instituted and
enforced by a culture's Irules for meaning-creation.
How conventions and beliefs acquire, sustain, or lose
authority might not seem a centrally "political" topic to the
sort of dualistic thinking which divides the world into ideal and
material realms--superstructure and base, consciousness and life,
art and society--and grants priority to the latter. A legacy of
Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, such dualism is evident in
Marcuse's claim that "art cannot change the world, but it can
contribute to changing the consciousness and drives of the men
and women who could change the world" (32-33). Reading is
thereby seen as at most an antechamber to the place where the
real action is. As Susan Suleiman argues, however, "one should .
. . not belittle the value of symbolic interventions in the realm
of the real": "language is part of the world (the 'real world')
and plays a non-negligible part in shaping both our perception of
it and our actions in it" (197). Foucault rightly notes that
"there are no machines of freedom" ("Space" 247). Altering how
people read will not 'automatically turn society upside down. But
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the epistemological questions at stake in reading--what beliefs
are entitled to legitimacy, for example, and what assumptions
about identity should prevail--are not merely preconditions to
politics but are themselves substantive issues with material
consequences for social relations. For many of the most
important recent political theories--those having to do with
gender, race, ethnicity, gay and lesbian identity·, multi-
culturalism, post-colonialism, and even ecology--how
epistemological categories are established and maintained is not
an idealistic side-issue but a site of crucial contestation.
Rather than seeing reading as an epiphenomenon, at most a
prelude to the real cultural work which occurs elsewhere, we
should regard it as one political site among others, not perhaps
the most decisive one but not trivial either, with its own
particular advantages and drawbacks. It is not the fulcrurn on
which the world can be moved (there is none). But because of
what Wayne Booth calls its "relatively cost-free offer of trial
runs" (485), reaqing can be astaging ground for exposing,
questioning, and experimenting with habitual ways of knowing the
world and being toward others which otherwise may remain cioaked
in the obscuring and therefore all the more coercive garb of
normalcy.
I want to consider in detail how a particular conception of
the reading process migh~ foster "postmodern democracy." By this
term I have in mind the need in our irreducibly multifarious
world to create forms of community which allow us to negotiate
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our differences without assuming a prior common ground or an
ultimately attainable consensus. In order to have mutually
beneficial relations between incompatible cultural conventions
and incommensurable beliefs, we need conditions and practices
conducive to what Habermas calls "communicative rationality,"
where no force operates other than "the unforced force of the
better argument" (Modernity 107)--but a genu1nely heterogeneous
rationality which does not assurne, as he does, that communieation
will or should result i~ agreement. 1 "Postmodern democracy" has
at least two requirements which reading can help to stage, model,
and habitualize: 1) ~eciprocal, non-reified acknowledgment of
the meaning-creating capacities of others with perhaps radically
different assumptions, experiences, desires, and interests; and
2) ironie recognition of the contingency and contestability of
the conventions and beliefs on the basis of which one must
nevertheless act despite their inability to justify themselves.
I want to explore the first point by inserting an early,
pioneering political theorist of reading, Jean-Paul Sartre, into
the debate between Habermas and Lyotard over the polities of
legitimation. 2 I will then develop the second point by
analyzing the implications for a politics of reading of the
arguments of some important neo-liberal thinkers (especially
Richard Rorty but also Ronald Dworkin and Judith Shklar). What I
hope will emerge is a view of reading as a paradoxieal,
democratic practice--a form of life which might make possible the
reciprocally enhancing interaction of incompatible forms of life.
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1. Reading and Non-Consensual Reciprocity
In the pivotal chapter "Why Write?" of his deservedly
classic text What Is Literature?, Sartre attempts to derive a
political imperative from a description of the reading process
through a bold if, finally flawed argument which is illuminating,
I think, precisely because of the difficulties which undermine
it. His memorable, controversial conclusion--that it is not
"possible to write a good novel in praise of anti-Semitism" (68)
--is less interesting tnan the reasoning through which he reaches
it. His crucial claim is both political and epistemologieal:
"the writer appeals to the reader's freedom to collaborate in the
production of his work" (54). According to Sartre, "the literary
object is a peculiar top which exists only in movement" (50).
More than the worde on the page, the work comes into being only
through the reader's active participation, which is "free" in at
least two senses: it depends on choices and decisions which
cannot be entirely determined in .advance, and it consequently
entails acts of transcendence, "a continual exceeding of the
wri.t ten thing" (53) by filling in gaps and making connections
which are not all prescribed. Because reading requires freedom
for the very production of meaning, Sartre concludes that writers
subvert the epistemological conditions necessary for their works
to exist if they deny freedom either in their style (by seeking
to overwhelm or coerce the reader) or in their themes: "It would
be inconceivable that . . . the reader could enjoy his freedom
while reading a work which approves or accepts or simply abstains
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from condemning the subjection of man by man" (67). Sartre
concludes: "the writer, a free man addressing free men, has only.
one subject--freedom" (68) .3 In his view, the political essence
of art follows from the essence of the reading process.
One of the first things one wants to do now, more than
forty-five years after Sartre wrote, is to quietly revise his
sexist word-choice. More than simply a change in what
constitutes good manners, however, the question of who is left
out by patriarchal language suggests that one man's appeal to
freedom might be another person's (perhaps woman's) subjection.
"Freedom" is not an absolute but is a socially contestable value,
and not all visions of freedom are mutually compatible. Sartre
assurnes that every appeal to freedom will be consistent with all
others, but antagonistic, incommensurable ideals of emancipation
can be projected by different communities with opposing
assumptions about life. The conflict of interpretations is in
part a contest about what emancipation might look like (or
whether it is po~sible at all). Sartre is blinded by what
Lyotard calls the "grand narrative of emancipation" which teIls
the story of human history as a synthetic, teleological
realization of liberty (see Postmodern Condition 31-37). A more
radical conception of freedom would recognize itself in the
diversity of language games and in their ongoing transformation
and contestation through the invention of new moves--the
heterogeneity which leads Lyotard to claim that "consensus is a
horizon that is never reached" (Postmodern Condition 61). The
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multiplicity of ways of reading is itself a sign of freedom, hut
the consequent contingency of "freedom" as a value makes reading
and writing for freedom a contestable practice which will vary
according to one's beliefs about human being and social life.
Part of what this flaw in Sartre's argument suggests is that
one cannot derive norms from experience through an impartial
description because how experience is interpreted depends on the
norms one brings to bear on it. This circle also vitiates
Habermas's attempt to define "communicative rationality" by
appealing to "the suppositions of rationality inherent in
ordinary communicative practice," standards implicit in "the
normative content of action oriented to mutual understanding"
(Modernity 76) .' Language, communication, and meaning are
essentially contested categories, however, which are susceptible
to widely diverging conceptions of what constitutes good
practice. Habermas's twin assumptions, first, that "participants
. . . can act communicatively only under the presupposition of
intersubjectively identical ascriptions of meaning" and, second,
that "reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human
speech" are neither neutral nor self-evident (Modernity 198;
Communicative Action 287). From Wittgenstein to Lyotard and
Derrida, it is possible to see much more productive value in
difference and disagreement both in the means and the ends of
linguistic exchange than Habermas does. But this circle does not
prevent one from arguing for a particular conception of
communication--or of reading--and then trying to justify it as a
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value worth holding for various reasons, including its
consequences for how it might shape our experience. Conceiving
of reading as a heterogeneous, variable activity can make it
desirable to argue for certain norms which the more monistic
Sartre and Habermas also advocate, even if they disguise this
advocacy behind claims that their values are not contingencies
but requirements inherent in the structure of communication.
One such norm is reciprocity. Because of the recognition a
writer must extend to tbe reader's capacities for meaning-
creation, Sartre calls reading "an exercise in generosity":
"each one trusts the otherj each one counts on the other, demands
of the other aS'much as he demands of himself" (Literature 58,
61). This description of writing and reading as acts of mutual
recognition resonates with Habermas's sense of reasoned exchange
as a non-objectifying, non-coercive practice based on the
assumption of equality. These visions of reciprocity are worth
analyzing further precisely because the proper structure of
reading and commqnication is less self-evidently derivable from
experience than either Sartre or Habermas assumes.
Sartre's description of reading as a process of reciprocal
recognition portrays an ideally non-coercive relation, but it
also raises important questions about the role of power and
constraint in meaning-creation and communicative interaction.
Sartre describes reading as "a dialectical going-and-coming, " an
open-ended to-and-fro:
when I read, I make demandsj if my demands are met, what I
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am then reading provokes me to demand more of the author,
which means to demand of the author that he demand more of
me. And, vice versa, the author's demand is that I carry my
demands to the highest pitch. Thus, my freedom, by
revealing itself, reveals the freedom of the other.
(Literature 62)
This mutual disclosure of one another's meaning-creating powere
suggests a sort of reciprocally enhancing meeting of
subjectivities which runs counter to Sartre's analysis of the
"look of the Other" in Being and Nothingness, where he argues
that the other's gaze threatens to objectify and take power over
me because my self-for-myself is unrecognizable beneath my self-
for-others (see 340-400). The rare gift of reading would thus
seem to be its staging of a reciprocal exchange between
subjectivities at the level of their being-for-themselves which
suspends the mutual objectification of gazes locked in a battle
for power. The question would then be whether the kind of non-
coercive, non-obj";ectifying interaction modelled in reading could
be extended to other spheres of existence, including everyday
communicative interaction.
Power is also at work in reading, however, as Sartre
acknowledges in Saint Genet. There he describes how Genet fights
back against others' objectifications of hirn by "set[ting]
fascinating traps for other freedoms" through the rhetorical
games he plays with the reader, who in the experience of being
manipulated, teased, enticed, and frustrated by the text
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"recognizes Genet's freedom and knows that he is not recognized
by Genet" (555, 552). This is a particular instance of the
general problem of whether what Richard Poirier calls "the
performing self" of the author in the text also facilitates the
reader's powers or, vampire-like, seeks ascendancy at the
reader's expense. The text's quest for power can also take less
self-serving but no less problematic forms. For example, as
Booth argues, "all narratives are 'didactic'" because "all works
do teach or at 'least try to"--attempting to mold the reader's
character or influence his or her beliefs (151-52).4 The
pedagogical and rhetorical ambitions of a text harbor a will-to-
power in their very desire to change the recipient. Whether the
text's intentions are benevolent or not, the reciprocity of
reading would seem to stand in necessary conflict with the
deployment of rhetorical power. Sartre recognizes this dilemma
by describing reading as an exchange of "demands"--with the
author's will-to-power parried and countered by the reader's
reciprocal assertion of the right to set the terms of the
encounter. Power is thereby not suspended in reading but made
mutual in an endless to-and-fro of claims on the other, a dance
in which each partner takes turns leading.
The metaphor of the dance suggests a general paradox of
power as it pertains to reading. As Foucault argues, power can
be both repressive and productive (and is often both at once) :
"it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but ...
it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms
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knowledge, produces discourse" ("Truth" 119). If reading entails
at least a partial submission to the rules of the games played by
the text, these restrictions and constraints are not merely
dominating and limiting but also make possible the production of
meaning. Or at least that is the reader's wager in accepting a
text' s offer to play. A dilemma facing the reader, ·however, is
the same as that posed by any discursive regime. How can one
decide whether any particular rules for "truth" are more coercive
or enabling, more restrictive or constructive, more objectifying
or enhancing? Further, when one is in the middle of playing the
game (or being played by it), does one even have the power to
pose this question? These are issues which cannot be resolved
absolutely or in the abstract, apart from a specific examination
of concrete practices (and sometimes they cannot be raised at
all) .
The problem, as Habermas puts it, is how "to discriminate
between apower that deserves to be esteemed and one that
deserves to be devalued" (Modernity 125; original emphasis) .
This is only a problem because of the inherent duality of
\
discursive rules as both coercive and creative, restrictive and
productive, a threat to the subject's meaning-making capacities
but also their condition of possibility. The very difficulty of
deciding Habermas's question, however, gives value to reading as
an arena in which this paradox of power can be staged, played
with, andexplored. An advantage of reading is not only that
readers can withdraw.assent from textual regimes more easily than
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they often can in daily life, but also that the modelling
capacities of r~ading might allow them to examine, test, and
criticize ratios of repression and production which they are
perhaps too caught up by to understand or quest ion in everyday
communicative practice.
One criterion in making the discrimination Habermas calls
for might be mutual recognition. Genet would therefore deserve
the reader's suspicion ~nd run the risk of the withdrawal of
assent, even if his own. experience of refused mutuality had set
his games in motion in the first place. Reciprocity is not
outside the realm of power, however. Lyotard suggests as much
when he claims that "to speak is to fight, in the sense of
playing"--a claim he qualifies in an important way: "This does
not necessarily mean that one plays in order to win. A move can
be made for the sheer pleasure of its invention" (Postmodern
Condition 10). Wolfgang leer distinguishes similarly between
play "as achieving victory (establishing meaning) or as
maintaining freeplay (keeping meaning open-ended)." The former
kind of play mobilizes the rhetorical power which seeks to
influence or change the reader. But power is also involved in
playas the perpetual motion of differences--what leer calls the
"ever-decentering movement," the continual "oscillation, or to-
and-fro movement, [which] is basic to play" (Prospecting 252,
255) .5 According to lser, this kind of play typically
establishes boundaries in order to transgress them, setting up
new oppositions which make possible new moves and which invite
Armstrong--13
new border-crossings, creating new worlds to be toppled and
overturned so that yet other worlds can be constructed (see
Fictive and Imaginary 69-86). The sort of decentering freeplay
which seems more reciprocal and open-ended than attempts to
achieve victory is itself an unsettled and unsettling process
which can disrupt the relation between the players.
The creativity 9f transgression illustrates Nietzsche's
contention that form-giving requires both negation and
affirmation--or, in hislstriking phrase: "lf a temple is to be
erected, a temple must be destroyed" (95). Destruction, assault,
and violence seem inherent in the crossing of boundaries and the
upsetting of existing structures which make possible new
combinations of difference, new modes of play. Lyotard usefully
distinguishes between "two different kinds of 'progress' in
knowledge: one corresponds to a new move (a new argument) within
the established rulesi the other, to the invention of new rules,
in other words, a change to a new game." This latter kind of
innovation is necessarily disruptive, he argues: "the stronger
the 'move,' the more likely it is to be denied the minimum
consensus, precisely because it changes the rules of the game
upon which consensus had been based" (Postmodern Condition 43,
63) •
Lyotard criticizes Habermas's notion of "communicative
rationality" not only because "consensus does violence to the
heterogeneity of language games" but also because "invention is
always born of dissension" (Postmodern Condition XXVi also see
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"Notes on Legitimation"). Lyotard's recognition of the violence
and will-to-power of innovation, however, leads hirn to return to ·
the question of "justice" after he has rejected the value of
agreement. How, he asks, can we "arrive at an idea and practice
of justice that is not linked to that of consensus"?
Interestingly, despite his critique of communal assent as a
repressive, monistic norm, his two requi:rements for "justice"
both reinstate the principle of reciprocity: first, "a
renunciation of terror,." defined as "eliminating, or threatening
to eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with
hirn," and second, the stipulation that "any consensus on the
rules defining agame and the 'moves' playable within it roust be
local, in other words, agreed on by its present players and
subject to eventual cancellation" (Postmodern Condition 66, 63).
Lyotard's very critique of consensus thus leads hirn to reaffirm
the importance of reciprocity because mutual recognition is
necessary to make possible the innovative, transgressive sorts of
play he values.
Reciprocal acknowledgment and ever-renewed negotiation
between the players are required to keep the play-space intact
and to preserve the possibility of productive interaction between
heterogeneous ways of playing. But the to-and-fro of reciprocity
is not the same as agreement. As Foucault argues, "one must not
be for consensuality, but one must be against nonconsensuality"
("Politics" 379). Where "consensuality" irnplies a restrictive
insistence on identity and homogeneity, refusing
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"nonconsensuality" insists on mutual recognition so that
differences may play. As a norm for heterogeneous, social~y
useful meaning-creation, non-consensual reciprocity--a non-
reified mutuality without the assumption of prior or ultimate
agreement--makes possible the ongoing generation and
communication of differences, whether by obeying or transgressing
the rules.
One value of reading is that it can be practiced in such a
way as to stage,this kind of non-consensual reciprocity. This is
a political value, I would argue, because the social bond staged
in non-consensual, non-objectifying, mutually transformative
interactions with texts could model behaviors which would be
useful in other social interactions. The sort of reading I have
in mind would differ from either a conservative reverence of
canonical authority or a radical unmasking of textual false
consciousness. Reading guided by the norm of non-consensual
reciprocity would not assurne that the outcome should be agreement
with the values of the canonical text (nor would it assume that
the values of worthwhile texts were mutually compatible) .
Rather, an assumption of parity between the worlds of text\ and
reader would mean that the authority of the conventions governing
both were at play and at risk. Reading would thereby entail the
ongoing staging of Habermas's question about which rules for
meaning-creation deserve credence without deciding it in advance
in favor of either text or reader--or without ever deciding it
once and for all inasmuch as non-consensual reciprocity grants
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all parties the ongoing authority to propose new rules and
challenge existing ones. This kind of reading would thus enaet
Sartre's call for a "constant renewal of frameworks, and the
continuous overthrowing of order once it tends to congeal"
(Literature 139).
The perpetual questioning of authority implied by reading as
a practice of non-consensual reciprocity is not the same,
however, as the hermeneutics of suspicion. Unmasking a text's
deceptions can be an assertion of power which denies mutuality by
refusing to hear the claim it would make on us. Locating a
work's primary worldly entanglements in its originating context
can be a way of refusing torecognize its attempt to speak aeross
historicalor cultural distance, thereby preventing our different
worlds fram engaging one anothe~. The need to grant the work a
hearing does not mean, however, that one must assent to its
claims or even, finally, take them at face value. As the example
of Genet once again suggests, unmasking a text's strategies for
asserting power over the reader can be a means of maintaining
reciprocity, especially (but not only) when it refuses us the
recognition it demands. As in other social relations, so in
reading, it is not always clear when to believe or suspect one's
interlocutor, if only because believing and doubting provide
their own proofs. It is sometimes possible, however, to
recognize what Gadamer calls a "Spielverderber" (or spoil-sport),
whose actions thwart rather than facilitate the playing of the
game (92). Unmasking strategies that disadvantage or marginalize
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other players, exploiting their good faith or restricting their
capacities, would be a move not only authorized but even required
by non-consensual reciprocity. It can therefore provide a
standard of justice against which to measure a text's--or any
interlocutor's or fellow citizen's--claims, even if it cannot
always tell us how to evaluate them.
2. Reading and the Negotiation of Differences
As a democratic value, non-consensual reciprocity is not an
end in itself hut a means to facilitating the mutually beneficial
interaction of differences. Onee again reading ean stage certain
behaviors which might model and eneourage such exchange.
Creating and maintaining spaces in which different forms of life
with incompatible values and beliefs can productively interact is
a non-trivial challenge across a variety of social settings--from
the classroom and academic department where the "culture ware"
are sometimes fought with alarming feroeity, to the national
arena (not only in the U.S. but also in many other places) where
ethnic and other kinds of diversity all too often lead to
reciprocal demonization instead of multicultural pastiche, or to
the .international scene where, in our fluid post-Cold-War, post-
colonial situation, the collapse of previously stabilizing
oppositions has resulted in a proliferation of conflicts.
Reading cannot of course solve all of these problems. But a
particular practice of reading could be socially useful in the
current climate·by promoting the paradoxical and therefore
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precarious behaviors required for the ongoing negotiation of
differences--a negotiation which is not only civil and non-
violent but mutually worthwhile and potentially transformative.
A threat tothe productive exchange of differences is the
tendency of any epistemological community to demonize and
scapegoat the Other in defensive rejection of the recognition of
the contingency of its own values and beliefs (see Girard). This
tendency is exacerbated by the mutually reinforcing dangers of
habitualization and homogeneity--how assumptions acted on again
and again become naturalized and how beliefs shared
unquestionably take on the status of absolutes. A practice of
reading as a non-consensual engagement with differences can
counteract this normalization. The practice I have in mind would
stress three dimensions of the reading process: 1) how reading
can stage the paradox, constitutive of democracy, that there can
be many forms of life with equal dignity and worth; 2) how
reading can facilitate the imagination of change by suggesting
that the world could be otherwise; 3) how reading can thereby
encourage the recognition of the contingency of the very beliefe
one sets in motion co make the text cohere.
What I am suggesting about reading does not have to happen.
Reading does not automatically make better citizens through its
essential epistemological processes (if it did, English
departments would be less politically self-destructive places
than they often 'are). Some interpretive methods facilitate more
than others do the playful openness to multiplicity and
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cultivation of contingency I have in mind. But these attitudes
are themselves compatible with a v.ariety of hermeneutic
strategies, not just one particular set of presuppositions and
procedures. They are democratically open to heterogeneity
because they can be enacted in varying ways by readers with
different assumptions, values, and conventions.
The reading practice I am proposing would stage the posture
which Richard Rorty calls "liberal irony" but would confront more
fully and directly somefcrucial difficulties which he tries to
minimize or evade. According to Rorty, a liberal ironist "faces
up to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefe and
desires." Liberal irony recognizes that "the idea that the world
decides which descriptions are true can no longer be given a
clear sense", that as a result a variety of not necessarily
mutually compatible vocabularies or interpretive frameworks can
perform effectively, and that the most we can ever have is "a
circular justification of our practices, a justification which
makes one feature of our culture look good by citing still
another. n Liberal ironists therefore combine "commitment with a
sense of the contingency of their own commitment"--recognizing
the lack of necessity of ntheir language of moral deliberation,
and thus of their consciences, and thus of their community" but
nevertheless "remain[ing] faithful to those consciences"
(Contingency xv, 5, 57, 61, 46). The liberal ironist's
combination of contingency and commitment is a contradictory
practice which is easier to describe than to follow. Acting on
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one's beliefs tends to undercut professions of their contingency
by habitualizing and naturalizing them, but keeping their lack or
justification continually in view may inhibit action and
engagement. The defining contradiction of liberal irony makes it
precarious, susceptible to falling into either paralyzed
skepticism or smug complacency if the tension lapses between
doubting one's beliefs and nevertheless believing them. 6
Reading can help to stage and model the paradoxical task of
combining contingency and commitment because of the contradictory
status of our beliefs when we read. In order to make the parts
of a text cohere, we need to project hypotheses about the
configurations they form, guesses about textual patterns which we
generate from our more enduring, deeply held presuppositions
about literature, language, and life (see my Conflicting Readings
1-19). The paradox of reading is that, by invoking our own
beliefs in this way, we make another world take shape which may
be based on assumptions and interests very different from and
perhaps even ant~gonistic to the ones we hold. By the very
deployment of our own bel.iefs and values, we may create a world
which demonstrates their relativity and challenges their
ascendancy. Again, this does not have to happen; it is very easy
for the hermeneutic circle to remain closed, with our
presuppositions confirrning thernselves by finding only what they
seek. But if we read for non-consensual "reciprocity, directed by
an ideal of dialogue as mutual recognition without the necessity
of agreement, then the hypotheses about a work's configurations
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which we project can allow otherness to speak through beliefs it
may question, at the very least by demonstrating their
contingency. Reading would then entail precisely the paradox
characteristic of "liberal irony" in that we concretize the
different assumptions, values, and interests which make up the
text's world by acting on conventions and commitments whose
relativity the process of reading at the same time reveals. This
contradiction of reading t can make it an unsettling praetiee that
can lead to the overturtiing of our beliefs or to their
transformation as the possibility of new combinations of
attitudes are disclosed.
This doubling of worlds in reading differs from
epistemological models based on identification. For example,
Martha Nussbaum argues that "the novel makes us acknowledge the
equal humanity of members of social classes other than our own,
makes us acknowledge workers as deliberating subjects with
complex loves and aspirations and a rieh inner world. . . . It
thus inspires compassion, wonder, and the passion for justice"
(893). This clalm is both too narrow and too broad. Texts ether
than the novel can confront the reader with different forme of
life, but the result of this doubling is not as automatie or as
immediately uplifting as Nussbaum suggests. The juxtaposition of
worlds in reading is much more unpredictable but also potentially
more socially productive than the imaginative identifieatien with
otherness which Nussbaum calls fore The relation of my world and
the text's world which doubling brings about is not empathie
Armstrong--22
identification which unifies different ways of being but a
dynamic oscillation between the "me" and the "not-men which may
resist synthesis or resolution. Because of the principle of
difference which doubling entails, it can transform the
participants. By overcoming differences, identification reduces
the challenge of the negative and therefore may diminish the
impetus for change. Empathic assimilation of otherness gives too
little play to the transformative power of opposition and
negation.
Although Rorty values the invention of new modes of self-
creation (he calls the poet--nthe maker of new words, the shaper
of new languagesn-_nthe vanguard of the species"), he tries to
contain the disruption caused when beliefs or vocabularies clash
by "making a firm distinction between the private and the public"
(Contingency 20, 83). I want to examine this controversial
proposal in some detail because exposing the fallacies of the
"public-private n split as it pertains to reading and writing will
allow me to expl~in how my model of reading offers a better
solution to the problem of rival conceptions of existence. 7
Practicing reading as an exercise in "liberal i rony 11 attempts to
address the opposition of rival worlds by transforming it into a
socially useful reciprocity rather than trying to neutral.ize it"
through a strategy of containment which in any case will not
work.
Rorty is worried, and justifiably so, about the will-to-
power of competing vocabularies or visions of self-creation--
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about their desire to drive out rivals, establish their
ascendancy, and thus deny their contingency. "We should stop
trying to combine self-creation and politics," he advises; we
should "equalize opportunities for self-creation and then leave
people alone to use, or neglect, their opportunities, " "to work
out their private salvations, create their private self-images,
reweave their webs of belief and des ire in the light of whatever
new people and books they happen to encounter" (Contingency 120,
85). But precisely bec~use of what the reading process suggests
about the necessary entanglement of the "private" and the
"public,1I it is not clear that they can be kept separate, and the
contradictions in Rorty's own account of reading and self-
creation suggest as much. For one thing, to "encounter new
people and books" is obviously a social rather than purely
private experience, even if it takes place in the mind of an
individual reader. The play of opposing beliefe which reading
can set in motion is potentially transformative-because it is an
intersubjective meeting of different presuppositions and values
rather than a purely personal communion with oneself.
Rorty's observations about reading and writing repeatedly
call into question his separation of "public" and "private." For
example, Rorty claims that Proust "had no public ambitions"--"he
managed to debunk authority without setting hirnself up as
authority, to debunk the ambitions of the powerful without
sharing them" (Contingency 118, 103). But he can only succeed by
inculcating new ways of seeing in the reader, new attitudes
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toward "authority" which require changes in our beliefs which
will themselves become authoritative if they win acceptance and
become conventional, the kind of attitude we recognize as
"Proustian." Rorty acknowledges Proust's authority when he notes
that, because of the adoption of Remembrance of Things Past into
the canon, "anyone who wants to write a bild:ungsroman has to come
to terms with Proust." Rorty also recognizes that "you cannot
create a memorable character without thereby making a suggestion
about how your reader should act" (Contingency 136-37, 167).
This is true, however, because the "private" experience of
reading makes more of a "public" claim to mold our beliefs and
values than he admits when he asserts that "novels are a safer
medium than theory for expressing one's recognition of the
relativity and contingency of authority figures" (Contingency
107). Only a theorist could think this (ask Salman Rushdie) .
Reading can have political consequences because self-
creation is a social process. Borrowing from Harold Bloom's
model of poetic influence and self-fashioning, Rorty recognizes
that "even the strongest poet is parasitic on her precursors"
because new metaphors can only be created fram previously
existing, linguistically shared materials; even more, "she is
dependent on the kindness of all those strangers out there in the
future" to distinguish her "genius" from "eccentricity or
perversity" by demonstrating that "we can find a use for" her
creation (Contingency 41, 37). According to Bloom, however, it
is precisely this dependency of poets on others for their
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materials and validation that they attempt to deny by refusing to
accept their indebtedness or their historical contingency (see
Anxiety 5-16). The poetic drive for divination is fueled by the
insufficiency of the private sphere, its entanglement with public
processes which deprive poets of the sense of autonomy Bloom
claims they·seek. Rorty may be right, citing Bloom and
Nietzsche, that "the strong maker, the person who uses words as
they have never before ~een used, is best able to appreciate her
own contingency" (Conti~gency 28). But that is why, according to
Bloom, strong poets seek a sort of recognition from the reader
which grants them ascendancy and denies their contingency by
taking over the reader's world.
These dilemmas arise only because the beliefs about
language, literature, and life which we encounter in texts seek
to 'win assent and to displace the presuppositions and values of
the reader which are paradoxically responsible for their
concretization. They are not satisfied with remaining contingent
themselves even if they point out the centingency ef the reader's
own beliefs. Reading may be a private act in some senses, but it
is also a meeting of beliefs and values in the social space where
conventions and attitudes compete for allegiance. Reading thus
refutes the effert to contain the will-to-power of rival
vocabularies by distinguishing between private and public but
instead enacts their conflict in a way that stages the problem of
negotiating differences and makes it a task for the reader.
A more satisfactory response to this conflict is Rorty's
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argument that we should "call 'true' (or 'right' or 'just')
whatever the outcome of undistorted communication happens to be,
whatever view wins in a free and open encounter" (Contingency
67). But again the reading process suggests some necessary
revisions in this formulation, first of all (as Rorty would I
think agree) that perhaps no single view will prevail. In order
to make sure that "persuasion" rather than II'force" decides such
encounters, Rorty place~ a premium on freedom: "lf we take care
of political freedom, truth and goodness will take care of
themselves 11 (Contingency 84) . 8 As Lyotard' s worries about
"terror" suggest, however, freedom must be supplemented by mutual
recognition to make such encounters "just." We cannot assume
that rhetoric alone will create justice because persuasion
en~ails a will-to-power which is sometimes indistinguishable from
force, whether motivated by'a Bloomian drive for ascendancy, the
resentment of a Genet, or less complicated desires for dominance.
"Undistorted communication" demands that we interrogate
persuasion to assure it does not violate reciprocity. This
dilemma is especially evident in the reading process, where the
efforts of rhetorical power to move or shape the reader always
threaten to disrupt the parity required for the to-and-fro
exchange of mutual demands. The doubling of worlds which reading
as an exercise in liberal irony seeks to establish and maintain
is a precarious achievement which requires vigilance as weIl as
vulnerability from the reader.
If ß however, non-consensual reciprocity makes reading a
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playful exchange between the reader's beliefs and the text's,
then this doubling can facilitate the "free and open encounter"
Rorty calls for--perhaps, indeed, in a manner not so likely to
occur in other areas of society where the power of shared,
habitual frameworks may be less visible and thus more
intractable. One political value of reading is that its ability
to reveal the contingency of the reader's customary commitments
and conventions may open up possibilities of criticism and choice
not available in everyday life under the normalizing pressure of
prevailing epistemological regimes. Precisely because no
standpoint outside of riyal vocabularies is available for judging
them, the conflict of beliefs which reading may set in motion can
allow differences and distinctions to become apparent which would
not be evident within a single framework. The doubling of
perhaps incompatible worlds in reading can disclose their
comparative advantages and disadvantages not in relation to some
neutral ground but diacritically, by delineating what they are
not.
By staging the interaction of incommensurable conceptions of
existence, the reading practice I am advocating implies something
like what Ronald Dworkin calls "the right to equal concern and
respect" necessary for democratic governance: "Government must
treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human
beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and with
respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of forming and
acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be
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lived" (272-73). The doubling of belief in reading requires a
similar granting of "concern and respect" to different forms of
1
1
life. Some inequalities in reading are productive, as when, for
example, a text exceeds a reader's understanding and talls for
the development of new capacities to meet its demands.
Analogously, a player may have to learn new rules to play an
unfamiliar game, but such growth and discovery imply respect for
the dignity of the reader-player as someone capable of
assimilating new conventions and responding to the text's gambits
with moves of his or her own. Other inequities are more
insidious and disruptive because they entail violations of a
player's dignity--whether through the forceful refusal or
restriction of the possibility of participating, or through an
unequal distribution of resources and opportunities which also
results in exclusion or diminished ability to join the exchange.
One of the reasons why debates about who has the right to read in
what ways have political significance is that they raise
quest ions of this kind about access to the democratic arena where
the granting of equal respect and concern entitles participants
to negotiate differences. Analogous dilemmas occur in reading
and democracy because both stage the problem of how alternative
conceptions of existence--different visions of self-creation,
rival vocabularies for constructing the world, opposing if
equally contingent commitments--can beneficially interact. 9
A call for equal concern and respect similarly informs
Rorty's stipulation that liberal ironists "include among [theirl
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ungroundable desires their own hope that suffering will be
diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by other human
beings will cease." Rorty's liberal thinks "cruelty is the worst
thing we do" (Contingency xv), and the cruelty of humiliation is
particularly repugnant because it denies others their power of
self-creation. "Humiliation" is not a stable value, however,
because what counts as a worthwhile conception of existence is
subject 'to dispute. The meaning of a worthy life--and thus of
what might be considered shameful or wounding--is not a given but
a variable susceptible to cultural contestation.
Judith Shklar consequently distinguishes between
"injustice," a socially remediable wrong, and "misfortune," an
accident or debility for which no one is responsible: nthe line
of separation between injustice and misfortune is a political
choice ll which can be questioned and revised, and "yesterday's
rock solid rule is today's folly and bigotry." A society may
wish to alleviate the suffering of misfortune, but it has a
stronger obligation to redress the grievances of injustice. As
Shklar points out, however, lIit will always be easier to see
misfortune rather than injustice in the afflictions of other
people. Only the victims occasionally do not share the
inclination to do so. 11 But in a democracy I1their sense of their
rights ... deserves a hearing," she argues, because to do
otherwise would be to deny them the "minimum of human dignity"
(Injustice 5, 8, 15, 35, 86) .10 In a democratic society the
shape of justice is therefore constantly open to change because
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it is a differe~tial product ever subject to contestation and
redescription. The line between "misfortune" and "injustice"
gets drawn and redrawn through protests in which aggrieved
citizens present and dispute their opposing senses of what they
are due. This process is necessarily conflictual and
differential because, as Lyotard points out, "it is in the nature
of a wrong not to be established by consensus" (Differend 56) •
Rorty hopes that "cruelty" and "humiliation" can be defined
less problematically. He calls on us "to separate the question
'Do you believe and desire what we believe and desire?' from the
question 'Are you suffering?'" (Contingency 198). Conflicts
about self-creation cannot always be so cleanly separated,
however, from issues of what constitutes cruelty and suffering.
Some kinds of suffering seem easier to recognize than others do
regardless of the vocabulary employed (the anguish of a dying
cancer victim, for example, as opposed to the suffering caused by
sexual harassment, racial discrimination, homophobia, or
religious bigotry). This greater visibility may simply reflect
the greater agreement of the society about the applicable
epistemological and moral categories. More is at stake here,
however, than the notorious and perhaps undecidable question of
whether another's pain can be recognized outside of a vocabulary.
Shklar's distinction between "misfortune" and "injustice tl shows
that significant areas of dispute with practical consequences may
still remain even if, following Rorty, each party recognizes the
other's suffering. A victim of homophobia, after all, has
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weighty, non-trivial reasons for preferring to be recognized as a
victim of social injustice instead of having his or her sexual
orientation stigmatized as amisfortune. The status of some
kinds of suffering can be controversial because it has yet to be
settled through political negotiation between parties who hold
different views about the wrongs that can hurniliate or injure,
views which go back to their different conceptions of what
constitutes a worthy lif~. In such disputes, what the different
parties "believe and deEfire" is integral to their sense of what
is cruel and humiliating, and such conflicts are consequential
rather than merely metaphysical because decisions about how to
define injustice set norms for individual and social behavior.
Conceiving of reading as a non-consensual interaction
between different worlds can make it an arena for playing out the
question of injustice. For this to occur, construing texts needs
to be seen as a double, non-consensual to-and-fro in which the
values and beliefs of both players are at stake. By juxtaposing
conventional norms with views that contest their inevitability,
this doubling of worlds can challenge the naturalization of the
prevailing notions of "injustice" and "humiliation." By bringing
opposing conceptions of existence into a dialogue which reveals
and questions the defining limits of each, reading can enact the
renegotiation of what counts as a correctable social wrong. By
demonstrating the contingency of the beliefs the reader sets in
motion and suggesting alternative assumptions, desires, and
interests, the process of reading can stage the Bort of exchange
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of differences which has the power to reconfigure social values--
the sort. of conversation about "the sense of injustice" which can"
change a community's understanding of the kinds of cruelty and
humiliation entitled to recognition and remedy.
This dialogue does not have to happen, however, either in
reading or in other areas of social life, because the voice
protesting injustice is very easy to squelch or ignore. The
reading practice I am advocating would try to keep alive the
potentially transformat±ve, often unsettling conversation through
which the meaning of injustice can change by having readers put
their assumptions at risk. Reading in this way would try to keep
in mind the lack of necessity of the conventions and commitments
it puts in play for the very reason that the conversation about
injustice is precarious, ever in danger of being shut down by the
self-protective force of prevailing norms or by·the will-to-power
of rival voices.
Readers who themselves have a sense of injustice may reply
that they cannot afford to bracket their convictions because that
may disadvantage them in their arguments against oppression.
The necessary contradiction of such a position is that these
readers require injustice to be a variable, so that its meaning
can be changed, even as they need to act as if their own values
are absolutes--self-evident entitlements whose violation is an
intolerable outrage. If they win their argument (perhaps by
invoking the values of mutual recognition and equal concern which
also inform my conception of reading), they must then relinquish
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their absolutism or else they will lapse into the same
exelusionary essentialism against whieh they protested. My
polities 'of reading should be their ultimate goal and their
implieit norm, I would argue, even if they roust temporarily, for
strategie reasons, aet as if their beliefs and values were not
eontingent--paradoxieally braeketing their braeketing of their
eommitments so that they ean later take the first braekets off.
This is different from ~ terroristie attempt to stop the play of
reading by seeuring the.permanent dominanee of one particular
eoneeption of existenee, although the neeessary strategie refusal
to eompromise of those with a sense of injustiee is sometimes
hard to distinguish, and unavoidably so, from that kind of
absolutism.
Every kind of reading differs according to its praetieal
aims, and my goal of ereating a play-spaee where differenees can
freely and reeiproeally interact will be more or less compatible
with aims other politieally engaged readers may have. What this
problem suggests ~is that my polities of reading, although an
attempt to faeilitate the negotiation of differenees between
ineommensurable forms of life, is itself based on beliefe and
values whieh other ways of reading may eontest. Although the
doubling I advocate sets ideologies against eaeh other to
diselose their eontingeney, it is not without its own ideology
and is itself nothing more than a eontingent, eontestable
praetiee. This .paradox is also a eonstitutive eontradiction of
demoeraey, however. pemoeraey is one form of life among others,
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even as it offers itself as a mode of structuring the relations
between different forms of life which would {or so it argues}
allow them to thrive. This offer is a contestable claim based on
values, assumptions, and aims which other conceptions of
existence may not accept. This contradiction'is not, as is
sometimes thought, disabling proof of the false promise of
pluralism (it isn't "neutral" after all). It is instead evidence
of the contingencies and conflicts which make democracy possible
.
and, in the view of its advocates {like myself}, preferable to
other modes of life which would stifle heterogeneity. Democracy
is a contestable value, but that makes it worth advocating,
indeed makes it necessary for those who believe in it to plead
its case--to argue for the worthwhile consequences of the
equitable exchange of differences which mutual recognition can
facilit~te.ll There is no place outside of the contingencies
'-'
of ideology, value,and belief. The practice of reading as a
non-consensual, reciprocal, potentially transformative play of
differences is an attempt not to transcend those contingencies




10n the notion of "communicative rationality," also see
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1,
especially 10-42.
20n the debate between Habermas and Lyotard, see Wellmer,
Zur Dialektik von ModerBe und Postmoderne, especially 105-109;
Jay, "Habermas and Modernism"; Jameson, "Forward" to Lyotard,
Postmodern Condition; Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on
Postmodernity"; McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics 180-210;
and Poster, "Postmodernity and the Politics of Multiculturalism:
The Lyotard-Habermas Debate over Social Theory." My concern is
less with the details of their debate, however, than with the
issues it raises for the theory of reading.
30n Sartre's literary theory, see Goldthorpe, Sartre:
Literature and Theory 159-84; Hollier, The Politics of Prose 83-
103, and Howells, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom 116-44.
40n the paradox of how a text might exert a kind of power
over the reader which is emancipatory rather than coercive, also
see Chambers, Room for Maneuver, especially 14-18.
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c.
sOn "play" as a model for the reiiprocal understanding of
1\
otherness, also see my "Play and Cultural Differences."
61 examine this dilemma in greater detail in "The Politics
of Irony in Reading Conrad." Also see West, "The Politics of
American Neo-Pragmatism~"
7Among the many critiques which Rorty's "public-private"
split has received, see particularly Fraser, "Singularity and
Solidarity: Richard Rorty Between Romanticism and Technocracy,"
and Bhaskar, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom, especially 81-
96.
SOn this issue, see McCarthy, "Private Irony and Public
Decency" i Rorty's respons~, "Truth and Freedom, " and McCarthy's
answer, "Ironist Theory as Vocation." Also see Rorty, "The
Priority of Democracy to Philosophy."
9Dworkin is unfortunately self-contradictory on the issue of
whether this negotiation will or should end in agreement .. He
says "there are hard cases, both in politics and at law, in which
reasonable lawyers will disagree about rights, and neither will
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have available any argument that must necessarily convince the
other" (xiv). But at the end of Taking Rights Seriously he
contradicts his earlier pluralism about "hard cases" and claims
they have one right solution (see 290). It may be, as he argues,
a pragmatic necessity of the justice system that such cases must
be resolved: "It remains the judge's duty, even in hard cases,
to discover what the rights of the parties are, not to invent new
rights retrospectively" '(81). But Dworkin then adds:
"reasonable lawyers and'judges will often disagree about legal
rights, just as citizens and statesmen disagree about political
rights" (81). Leaving space for those differences to be
negotiated without presupposing a unitary outcome would seem an
obligation entailed by his insistence on the ultimate "right to
equal respect and concern."
lORorty borrows his injunction against cruelty from Shklar's
earlier book, Ordinary·Vices 7-44. He misrepresents her
position, however, inasmuch she argues that "for liberal and
humane people" to "choose cruelty as the worst thing we do" is
not to resolve or bypass the dilemmas of moral relativism but to
encounter all sorts of "paradoxes and puzzles" about what to
count as cruel and how to rank different evils (Vices 44). He
also ignores her clear declaration that "It is not possible to
think of vices as simply either public or private" (Vices 243).
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llA further implication of the contingency cf "democracy"
is, of course, that it is not a unitary, self-evident state of
affairs but is subject to conflicting interpretations even among
its advocates (as, for example, among Habermas, Lyotard, Rorty,
and myself) . For a particularly illuminating recent example of
such controversy, see Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition, " and
the "Comments" by Wolf, RockefeIler, and Walzer in Taylor,
Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition".
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